Abstract-In this paper, we explore the malicious meter inspection (MMI) problem in neighborhood area smart grids. By exploiting a binary inspection tree, we propose a DifferenceComparison-based Inspection (DCI) algorithm to quickly target the malicious meters. Different from existing algorithms, the DCI algorithm is designed based on three rules that are derived according to the difference comparison results in each local subtree. An attractive feature of the DCI algorithm is that it manages to skip a large number of nodes on the binary inspection tree and thus accelerates the detection of malicious nodes. Both analysis and simulation results show that DCI outperforms the existing inspection algorithms in terms of inspection speed, regardless of the ratio and permutation of malicious meters.
I. INTRODUCTION
Albeit offering higher efficiency, lower cost, and more environmentally sound energy management, smart grid brings new risks and threats at the same time [1] . Electricity theft is one of the serious issues that needs to be addressed. Due to the two-way communication of the smart grid, it is possible to compromise the electricity bill almost anywhere and anytime: a) while it is recorded, b) while it is at rest in the meter, and c) while it is in flight across the network [2] . The economical loss caused by electricity theft is huge. It has been estimated that utility companies worldwide lose more than $25 billion every year due to electricity theft. For India alone, the loss is around $4.5 billion [3] , $1.5 billion less than the United States [4] .
Extensive studies have been done to detect the electricity theft in smart grid. Typical works either take advantage of the physical checks of tamper-evident seals by field personnel or leverage the machine learning theory-based methods to build the consumption patterns and detect the anomalies [5] - [9] . However, the tamper-evident seals can be easily defeated [10] , and the machine learning-based approaches are not accurate enough to declare electricity theft only by the occurrence of deviation, since there are many other reasons, such as the dramatic change of weather and the random behavior of the * Corresponding author. electricity consumers, possibly leading to the deviation as well. On the other hand, literatures [11] - [15] developed a series of real-time comparison-based inspection algorithms, whose basic idea is to monitor the discrepancy between the subscribers and their inspectors (redundant smart meters installed at the power provider end). If the discrepancy exceeds a specified threshold [12] , it means that there may exist some 'malicious' meters 1 . However, the existing mutual inspection algorithms suffer the limitation on high deployment cost, since the mutual inspection strategy [12] demands one extra smart meter for each user, which may be unaffordable for the utilities, especially when the smart grid scales out. Xiao et al. employ a binary inspection tree as a logic structure for the detection of compromised meters [11] . However, the proposed algorithms in [11] only outperform the naive scanning approach when the ratio of malicious meters is low. This paper extends our previous work in [11] to utilize the binary inspection tree and proposes a new DifferenceComparison-based Inspection (DCI) algorithm that significantly improves the detection speed. DCI algorithm is different from the inspection algorithms in [11] mainly due to the following aspects:
• First, while conducting inspection on one node, the inspector calculates the amount of the stolen electricity of its corresponding subtree, which the algorithms in [11] neglect. The stolen amount is then used to determine which node to probe in the next step; • Furthermore, according to the difference between the amount of the stolen electricity of an internal node and that of its left child node, three rules, which allow the inspector to skip a large number of nodes in the binary inspection tree and quickly identify the dirty meters, are developed; • Finally, by adopting the pre-order traversal approach [16] , Fig. 1 . Smart grid in neighborhood area [15] inspections on all right children nodes are skipped, since their state ('dirty' or 'clean') 2 could be inferred from the difference between the amount of the stolen electricity of parent nodes and that of the left sibling nodes. The major contributions of this paper are stated as follows:
• We develop a novel inspection algorithm for the detection of malicious meters with provable efficiency.
• We provide rigorous proof which gives the performance bounds of the inspection steps (i.e., the metric of detection speed) of the proposed DCI algorithm.
• Compared to the prior studies, both theoretical analysis and simulation results show the superiority of the DCI algorithm in terms of algorithm efficiency, regardless of the ratio and permutation of malicious meters. Fig. 1 illustrates the basic architecture of the smart grid in a neighborhood area network (NAN) [15] . As shown in Fig. 1 , each house/apartment is equipped with a smart meter to record the service amount of the corresponding user. The smart meter can exchange information not only with the utilities through the public communication network (e.g., the Internet or the public switched telephone network [PSTN] [2] ), but also with the central observer meters, i.e., inspectors.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT

A. MMI in Neighborhood Area Smart Grid
In this paper, we consider a neighborhood area (e.g., an apartment building) smart grid with a total of n users periodically sending their service amounts to the utilities. Suppose that there are m (m ≤ n) users who defraud the utilities for charging less by compromising their meters. This paper studies the malicious meter inspection (MMI) problem [11] , whose objective is to minimize the number of needed inspection steps for identifying a complete set of malicious users with a limited number of inspectors.
Following the assumptions that have been made in [11] , there exists a inspector box located between the head inspector and the end meters. With an inspector box, one is capable of: 1) keeping each power line connected all the time to prevent outage, 2) easily adding and removing inspectors, and Fig. 2 . An inspector box located in the distribution room [11] 3) assign any user combination to one inspector through a computer program. Fig. 2 describes a possible look for the inspector box with one inspector. Without the inspector box, the head inspector is still able to detect an existing reading anomaly for the whole building; however, it is unclear that which users reported bad data.
This paper focuses on the case that there is only one inspector in the inspector box. As inspectors work independently, our algorithm can be easily extended to a multi-inspector setting.
B. Binary-tree based Inspection Scheme
With the assistance of an inspector box, we employ a binary inspection tree to facilitate the inspection process. Within the inspection tree, each internal node represents one possible inspection step, and each leaf corresponds to one smart meter to be checked. An existing fact [11] is that given n leaf nodes (i.e., smart meters), a binary inspection tree with 2n − 1 can be built 3 . In other words, we need at most 2n − 1 inspection steps to identify all m malicious meters.
During the inspection process, the inspector compares its own reading with the summation of the reported readings periodically. The two readings are usually not equal due to the following reasons: electricity loss during power transfer, measuring errors caused by communication delays and synchronization issues, random factors in the environment (e.g., weather), and electricity theft [12] . The first three reasons belong to technical loss which can always be estimated according to the electricity expertise, whereas the electricity theft lies in the scope of non-technical loss, which should be detected as early as possible.
An example of a binary inspection tree is shown in Fig.  3 . The leaf nodes stand for meters. The non-leaf nodes are logic nodes. An inspector can be logically configured at a non-leaf node to measure the total reading of the service amounts of the meters in the subtree and to compare the total reading with the total reported amount which is the sum of the reported amounts from the meters in the subtree. In the binary inspection tree model, the status of one node ('dirty' or 
Algorithm 1 probe
Input: one internal node of the binary tree, say node i Output: 'dirty' or 'clean'
The inspector reads the meter of node i;
In Algorithm 1, CM (i) denotes the set of all meters in node i's subtree; δ (i) denotes the detection threshold for meter i (i.e., an estimation of the technical loss for meter i). Function R(i) returns the reading of node i. If the difference between R(i) and the sum of reported readings is larger than the sum of the threshold values, then the node is considered 'dirty' [11] .
III. DCI ALGORITHM
In this section, we present the Difference-Comparisonbased Inspection (DCI) algorithm and analyze its performance bounds.
A. The DCI Algorithm
According to Algorithm 1, an logic node i of the binary tree is declared 'dirty' if there is at least one malicious meter in the subtree of node i, i.e., the following inequality holds
which is equivalent to
where
amount of the stolen electricity in the subtree of node i. For notational convenience, the right and the left children of node i are denoted as i.rchild and i.lchild, respectively.
From the definition of x(i), we have x(i) = x(i.lchild) + x(i.rchild), which means that if we examine any two nodes of the above three, then the state of the third can be inferred. Without loss of generality, we adopt the pre-order transversal search approach. Then x(i.rchild) could be calculated according to the difference between x(i) and x(i.lchild), i.e.,
Suppose that node i is probed as 'dirty', i.e., x(i) > 0. Then, based on the calculated x(i.lchild), the DCI algorithm proceeds the inspection process based upon the following rules: Two facts are obtained based on the above rules: Fact 1: If a node is a right child of its parent, the inspection on this node is always skipped, and therefore, we can save one inspection step.
Fact 2: If a node is 'clean', the entire subtree rooted at this node can be skipped. The saved inspection steps are determined by the number of nodes in the subtree.
The DCI algorithm is formally described in Algorithm 2.
A working example to illustrate the DCI algorithm is shown in Fig. 4 , in which, we assume that the permutation (i.e., the concatenation of the states) of the eight smart meters
, where '1' and '0' correspond to a malicious user and a clean user, respectively. We observe that both node a and its left child b are probed as 'dirty', i.e., x(a) > 0 > x(b) > 0. Based on Rule 3, the inspector can skip node c to check node f . In addition, based on Fact 1, nodes e and g can also be skipped. Also, after examining node m 1 , we have x(d) > x(m 1 ) > 0, thus x(m 2 ) > 0 holds; in other words, we infer that m 2 is dirty as well. As node e is inferred 'clean' (due to x(b) = x(d)), and node f is probed 'clean', the inspections on m 3 , m 4 , m 5 , m 6 are all skipped based on Fact 2.
In summary, 6 inspection steps (i.e., the number of 'X' and 'O') are needed to target the 3 malicious meters from the 8 users, which outperforms the brute force scanning approach that takes 8 steps to inspect meters one by one.
In addition, we observe that the DCI algorithm always deals with the top three levels of a subtree rooted at a node i as a processing unit. In Fig.4 
B. Analysis of the DCI Algorithm
The goal of the DCI algorithm is to detect the m malicious meters in a neighborhood area smart grid with n users. The following Lemma gives its performance bounds. Proof. We first prove the lower bound of N S (m, n) , i.e., N S (m, n) ⌈log 2 n⌉ + 1. It is evident that the case m = 1 yields the least inspection steps. Without loss of generality, we suppose that the permutation of the users when m = 1 is
]. According to the DCI algorithm, inspections are conducted only on the leftmost node at each level. Therefore, the minimum number of the inspection steps is equal to the height of the binary inspection tree, i.e.,⌈log 2 n⌉ + 1. In addition, if m = 2 and the two malicious meters are siblings, the same inspection process as that of the case m = 1 will apply to the binary tree since the state of the right sibling can be inferred after the left sibling is probed. However, when m > 2, we will have at least two pairs of sibling nodes to be probed, and this means that one extra step has to be performed in comparison to the case m = 1. Therefore, the lower bound of N S (m, n) is proven.
We then prove the upper bound of N S (m, n), i.e., N S (m, n) n. Obviously, the extreme case m = n returns the largest N S (m, n), and thus we obtain the upper bound of N S (m, n) when m = n. Two cases are discussed as follows.
(1) If n = 2 q for some positive integer q, the height of the binary inspection tree is q + 1. Therefore, on the bottom level (i.e., the (q + 1)-th level), n 2 meters will be probed. Similarly, on the q-th level (which is one level above the bottom level), n 4 meters will be probed. Following the pattern, the total number of inspection steps is calculated as follows:
(
(2) If there exist non-negative integers q and p such that 2 q < n = 2 q + p < 2 q+1 , the height of the binary inspection tree is q + 2. At the bottom level, the number of the leaf nodes is given by 2(2 q + p) − 1 − (2 · 2 q − 1) = 2p. Then, the overall number of inspection steps is calculated as follows:
Combining equations (5) and (6), we are able to show that the upper bound holds when m = n.
When m ≥ n 2 and each pair of sibling leaf nodes includes at least one malicious user, the analysis is essentially the same as the cases (1) and (2) . Therefore, the upper bound n of N S is achieved as well.
Lemma 1 shows the superiority of DCI since it is bounded by n without any restriction applied. In other words, DCI not only outperforms the naive scanning approach, but also outweighs each algorithm discussed in [11] . Lemma 1 gives the performance bounds of the DCI algorithm, given that m is a variable (i.e., N S (m, n) depends on the value of m). However, it is more interesting to discuss the case that m is a fixed value. In fact, when m is fixed, N S (m, n) depends on the permutation of the dirty meters.
We define that the m malicious meters are permuted evenly among n meters if their positions (or orders) at the bottom level of the binary inspection tree satisfy
where '%' denotes modulus operator, the function round(x) returns the nearest integer to x, and a is the position where the first malicious meter is located. For instance, if there are 4 malicious meters among 16 meters and the first malicious meter is the second meter (i.e., a = 2), according to equation (7), the positions of the four evenly distributed malicious meter are 2, 6, 10, and 14. Proof. We first prove (1) . Three cases are discussed:
Since malicious meters are evenly permuted, according to equation (7), for every pair of siblings leaves, at least one of them must be dirty. Therefore, we can leverage the result from Lemma 1 to show that N S (m, n) hits the upper bound.
Case II:
According to equation (7), we can infer that each bottom local subtree includes at least one malicious meter, and this means that at the upper levels the DCI algorithm always runs in the worst case. Therefore, N S reaches the maximum in this case.
Case III: m < n 4 . There exist a non-negative integerq such that 2 2q ≤ n < 2 2q+2 . Then, the binary inspection tree contains at most 4q local subtrees at the bottommost three levels. 5 To prove conclusion (1), we only need to prove that the number of local subtrees containing malicious meters reaches the maximum We then prove conclusion (2) . Let N j S denote the number of the inspection steps at the j-th level of the binary inspection tree. Then, the number of the inspection steps N S for the whole tree is calculated as
It is evident that N S 5 When n > 2 2q , the last local subtree is incomplete and we add virtual clean nodes to make it complete. is achieved when malicious meters are assembled leftmost.
IV. SIMULATION
In this section, we report the simulation results of the DCI algorithm. For fair comparison, each piece of data in the figures of this section is based upon the average value of 100 repeats. In addition, the simulation uses n = 512 as the number of users.
We first evaluate the performance of DCI algorithm under the following cases: (a) the malicious meters are evenly distributed; (b) the malicious meters are randomly distributed; (c) the malicious meters are compactly distributed at the leftmost and the middle, respectively. It is clearly shown in Fig.5 that no matter which case it is, N S is monotonically increasing with the ratio of the malicious meter γ. Moreover, we let N S min = ⌈log 2 512⌉ + 1 and N S max = 512. Then, N S min ≤ N S ≤ N S max holds for all the cases, which validates the correctness of Lemma 1. Particularly, if the malicious meters are evenly permutated, then N S will reach the maximum when γ ≥ 50%. This can be explained by the fact that when γ ≥ 50%, every pair of sibling nodes have to be on average probed once (only the left sibling node needs to be probed). For the case when the malicious meters are compactly distributed, N S grows linearly with γ, with 'leftmost' slightly better than 'middle'. and their permutation pattern is normally unavailable before the inspection. Fig.6 clearly shows that the DCI algorithm always returns the least number of inspection steps among the three algorithms for different γs. Though behaving good at the beginning, ATI degrades very fast as γ increases and is dominated by the scanning approach when γ is approximately above 20%. In contrast, the proposed DCI algorithm always uses less inspection steps than Scanning even when γ approaches 1.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the malicious meters inspection problem in a neighborhood area smart grid. By calculating (if necessary) the difference of the total amount of the stolen electricity between one node and its left child, we proposed the DCI algorithm in which three inspections rules are formulated to accelerate the inspection speed. Moreover, the lower and upper bounds of the inspection steps of the DCI algorithm were obtained. Both analysis and simulation results show that the proposed DCI algorithm outperforms the existing algorithms in terms of inspection speed, regardless of the ratio and permutation of malicious meters.
